Introduction to the Controversy
Last week, José Merino and Ernestina Godoy presented the senators of Morena with changes that the 4T agreed to incorporate into the new Telecommunications and Broadcasting Law initiative. A presentation circulated on various networks and media outlets, summarizing “points that have generated controversy and will be resolved with the modifications,” as well as “points that will remain controversial” – those Morena insists on imposing, despite the people’s evident discontent.
Article 228, Fraction III: The Obligation to Distinguish Information from Opinion
According to the presentation, one point that won’t be altered is the obligation for regulated media to “clearly distinguish factual information from the opinion of its presenter” (Article 228, Fraction III). Apparently, this supposed right of audiences will remain in the bill because it is based on Article 6 of the Constitution.
Constitutional Basis Misconception
Firstly, it’s false that the obligation to distinguish information from opinion is constitutionally grounded. Fraction IV, Section B of Article 6 of the Constitution prohibits “the transmission of advertising or propaganda presented as journalistic or news information,” a distinct obligation with its own regulation, unrelated to the dissemination of opinions but rather to concealed advertising transmission. This confusion could be easily dismantled in a habeas corpus lawsuit challenging the new law, assuming the judge is impartial.
Impracticality of the Obligation
Moreover, distinguishing factual information from the opinion of its presenter is practically unattainable due to human cognitive limitations. The requirement for “clear distinction,” as stated in the initiative, is beyond human mental capabilities.
According to Margarita A. de Sánchez (Procesos Básicos del Pensamiento, 1995), humans conduct observation in two stages. The human brain first identifies concrete stimulus characteristics (direct observation) and then engages in a mental abstraction process, integrating identified characteristics into meaningful wholes (indirect observation). For instance, a reporter might directly observe a damaged car on the street and identify uniformed individuals approaching in blue, followed by a red car. This is direct observation.
The same scenario could be described by the reporter as an automobile accident, with police officers and an ambulance responding to attend injured individuals. This second description is indirect observation, where the reporter incorporates their own knowledge context to interpret what they observed. This is how human thought involuntarily and automatically integrates personal inferences and assumptions, which can be classified as opinions and may involve unconscious cognitive biases.
Case Study: Claudia Sheinbaum’s Statements
Analyzing Claudia Sheinbaum’s statements during morning press conferences serves as an exercise. For example, on the previous Friday, Sheinbaum stated that “the image that wants to promote about Mexicans in the U.S. being violent is false and even a fabrication.” She also mentioned that the Wallace case “obviously has many questions…therefore, it is important to review it.” Are these direct observations or personal inferences and opinions?
Furthermore, Sheinbaum used phrases like “we believe,” “I think that,” and “I believe that” at least four times during the press conference. Does this mean the head of the executive can express opinions without distinguishing them from public information? This would create a legal system where media face more restrictions in disseminating information than the authorities themselves, contrary to how it should function.
Key Questions and Answers
- Q: Is the obligation to distinguish information from opinion constitutionally based? A: No, it is not. The relevant constitutional article pertains to prohibiting the transmission of concealed advertising, not distinguishing factual information from opinion.
- Q: Is it practically possible for media to distinguish information from opinion? A: No, it is not. Human cognitive processes cannot make this distinction clearly, as required by the proposed law.
- Q: Can authorities express opinions without distinguishing them from factual information? A: The proposed law would create a system where authorities have fewer restrictions on expressing opinions compared to media, which should ideally be the opposite.
