Brazil’s Supreme Court Imposes Severe Penalties on Bolsonaro and Others for Attempting a Coup
SÃO PAULO – The Brazilian Supreme Court has imposed severe penalties on former President Jair Bolsonaro and seven others, including three high-ranking military officials, for conspiring against democracy and attempting a coup. Bolsonaro received a sentence of 27 years and three months.
This judgment marks a historic milestone in Brazil, a country that has experienced numerous attempts at a state overthrow led or involving the military, as well as two dictatorships, with the longest lasting from 1964 to 1985. The decision by the Supreme Federal Court (STF) places Brazil among a select few countries that have investigated, charged, and convicted coup plotters through proper legal processes.
Reasons for Optimism and Key Questions
This development justifies some optimism regarding the resilience of Brazilian democracy, which endured its toughest test in four decades during Bolsonaro’s presidency. However, Brazil’s immunity against a future autocratic adventure hinges on answering several crucial questions:
- Will the far-right remain politically active and electorally strong with their main leader incarcerated?
- What strategies will traditional right-wing parties in Brazil adopt now that they allied with Bolsonaro but did not participate in the coup attempt?
- Will they eventually distance themselves from Bolsonaro, despite needing the far-right vote to defeat President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva in the 2026 elections?
Additionally, it is likely that U.S. President Donald Trump will question the legitimacy of the upcoming presidential elections after attempting to obstruct Bolsonaro’s prosecution through punitive sanctions and trade tariffs. How will this affect Brazil’s internal political dynamics?
Comparing Brazil and the United States
While Trumpism and Bolsonarismo share similarities, their leaders and contexts differ significantly. Brazilian society and the judicial system have effectively removed the authoritarian leader from the political game, benefiting from a constitution inspired by 21 years of authoritarian rule.
Brazil’s 1987-1988 Constituent Assembly included provisions for the democracy’s self-defense. Any orchestrated attempt to destroy it is considered a crime under Brazilian penal law. Moreover, Brazil’s extreme right has failed to organize as a dominant party, unlike in the United States where Trump took over one of the two major parties and purged internal opposition.
Right-wing parties in Brazil, which have gained ground in municipalities, state governments, and the National Congress since 2018, are hesitant to invest political capital in a bill that could exempt Bolsonaro from the STF’s ruling and bring him back into politics. The majority opposes Bolsonaro’s conviction while negotiating a watered-down amnesty in Congress to avoid alienating his supporters without triggering another political crisis.
Public opinion in Brazil differs, with a recent Datafolha survey showing 54% opposing amnesty for the leaders and participants of the 2023 coup attempt, while 39% supports it.
The Challenge of Finding a Viable Opponent to Lula
The main challenge lies in selecting a strong candidate for the right-wing to oppose Lula in the upcoming presidential race. In a tightly contested two-round election decided by a narrow margin, the task is to find a candidate who can mobilize the far-right (around 25% of voters) while remaining appealing to moderate conservative voters.
This candidate must also gain Bolsonaro’s approval, who is not known for honoring agreements. Several right-wing governors have pledged to pardon Bolsonaro once in power, a promise fraught with legal challenges and insufficient to ensure Bolsonaro’s support for a candidate of his own making in the next election.
By courting Bolsonaro, these governors risk damaging their image among centrist voters. Each punitive act or threat from Trump against Brazil and STF members compels them to engage in verbal contortions, avoiding contradiction with Bolsonaro while not endorsing unpopular measures among Brazilian voters.
Though unlikely, it’s not impossible that conservative parties, fearing electoral reasons, might be drawn back into a strategy solely beneficial to the far-right: inciting extreme polarization to question, with Trump’s support, the legitimacy of the upcoming elections. This radicalization strategy would likely facilitate Lula’s reelection and bring severe consequences for the country.
The strength of any democracy depends on the commitment of leading political forces to the constitutional order. The Brazilian right, without Bolsonaro’s support, bears a significant historical responsibility in the coming months.
About the Author
Sergio Fausto is the Executive Director of the Fernando Henrique Cardoso Foundation (FHC).
Copyright: Project Syndicate, 1995 – 2025
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